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ABSTRACT
Research on opportunity recognition and entrepreneurial cognition suggests that
entrepreneurs are likely to use and potentially benefit from heuristics (Baron, 1998, 2004;
Busenitz & Barney, 1997). Some heuristics, particularly well-refined and accurate prototypes,
may be valuable to entrepreneurs in recognizing opportunities (Baron, 2004). I seek, however, to
consider how other types of heuristics that lead to irrational, biased, and inaccurate judgments
(e.g., the betrayal heuristic) relate to opportunity recognition (Baron, 2004; Kahneman &
Lovallo, 1993). I specifically consider the underlying causal process through which the use of
these types of heuristics diminishes the ability to recognize opportunities. I posit that these
heuristics reduce the ability to recognize opportunities by causing entrepreneurs to consider less
information regarding potential opportunities. Further, I propose two individual differences that
allow certain entrepreneurs to mitigate the negative effect that these bias-causing heuristics have
on entrepreneurs’ ability of form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity.
I test my theory with two experimental designs that use a product from a technology
transfer office that has been licensed by entrepreneurs and applied to a real-world market. This
allows me to isolate the underlying variables of interest and to affix my theorizing to a welldocumented phenomenon (the licensing and application of tech-transfer technology/products by
entrepreneurs) (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012; Mowery, 2004; Shane, 2001). Results show that
some heuristic may cause individuals to consider less information about an opportunity, which
reduces their likelihood of forming an opportunity recognition belief. Post hoc analyses suggest
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that this indirect effect may be conditional on how reflective an individual is and that
entrepreneurs may be more reflective than non-entrepreneurs.
The major contribution of this dissertation is to examine the theoretical underpinnings as
to why certain types of heuristics inhibit entrepreneurs from forming the belief that they have
recognized an opportunity. Specifically, I suggest and show that bias-causing heuristics reduce
the amount of information that entrepreneurs consider about an opportunity and, as such, inhibit
opportunity recognition beliefs. Second, I provide some support for the notion that reflective
individuals are more likely to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity because
they consider more information about the opportunity when they initially rely on a bias-causing
heuristic. Lastly, this dissertation provides initial support for the notion that entrepreneurs may
be more reflective than non-entrepreneurs. Overall, I hope to point out that although a heuristicdependent processing style has been shown to be beneficial with regard to opportunity
recognition (Baron, 2004), the failure to consider the downside of certain heuristics and benefits
related to overcoming these heuristics may limit our understanding of the opportunity
recognition process.
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I dedicate this dissertation to my loving wife Jessica, who has fully supported me in this
endeavor and in life.
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CHAPTER ONE
Opportunity recognition has become one of the most important and researched topics in
the field of entrepreneurship as one cannot start a venture until they recognize an opportunity and
then determine if that opportunity is for them. Recently, scholars have suggested that this
recognition process unfolds over two stages. I focus on the first stage of this process, the
formation of an opportunity recognition belief, where individuals form the belief that there is an
opportunity for someone who is willing and able to take advantage of it (a third person
opportunity). Research on the formation of opportunity recognition beliefs has primarily focused
on individual differences (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012). Recently, however, research has begun
to focus on the cognitive processes that may set entrepreneurs apart from non-entrepreneurs and
help them recognize opportunities (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Shepherd, Haynie, & McMullen,
2012).
Entrepreneurial cognition research has suggested that entrepreneurs are likely to use and
potentially benefit from heuristics, which are often thought to be quick mental shortcuts that
allow for satisfactory solutions (Baron, 1998, 2004; Busentiz, 1999; Busenitz & Barney, 1997;
Shepherd et al., 2012; Simon, 1990). Specifically, research has suggested that the use of
heuristics may better allow entrepreneurs to recognize opportunities (Baron, 2004; Baron &
Ward, 2004; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Zahra, Korri & Yu, 2005). Although some heuristics,
particularly well-refined and accurate prototypes, may be valuable in the opportunity recognition
process, a vast amount of research shows other types of heuristics (i.e., bias-causing heuristics)
systematically lead to irrational, biased, and inaccurate judgments (Baron, 2004; Kahneman,
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2011). The former has been considered in the entrepreneurship literature; however, the latter has
received far less attention. I seek to consider the latter and specifically how these bias-causing
heuristics (e.g., the betrayal heuristic) lead to irrational, biased, and inaccurate judgments related
to forming the belief that one has recognized an opportunity (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). In
doing so, I consider the underlying causal process through which the use of these types of
heuristics diminishes the ability to form an opportunity recognition belief. Specifically, I posit
that these heuristics reduce the ability to form the belief that one has recognized opportunities by
causing entrepreneurs to consider less information about the potential opportunity.
I also propose two individual differences that allow certain entrepreneurs to mitigate the
negative effect that these bias-causing heuristics have on entrepreneurs’ ability to form the belief
that they have recognized an opportunity. I suggest that these individual differences enable some
entrepreneurs to overcome bias-causing heuristics and consider more information about an
opportunity, making them more likely to recognize that opportunity. I rely on a dual-process
theory of cognition to suggest that some entrepreneurs are more likely to shift from a heuristicbased, fast style of thinking to a more deliberate slower style of thinking, allowing them to
overcome bias-causing heuristics. Specifically, I consider the need for cognition, which is
associated with individuals who enjoy effortful cognitive activity and entrepreneurial alertness,
which is associated with entrepreneurs who have “a sense of what might be around the corner”
and with entrepreneurs being particularly sensitive to changes and unnoticed possibilities
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Kizner, 2009, p. 152; Tang, Kacmar, & Busenitz, 2012). In doing so, I
suggest that entrepreneurs high in each of these differences are more likely to override their
2

initial, biased, fast judgments, enabling them to consider additional information and as such be
more likely to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity (McMullen & Shepherd,
2006).
In considering the effect of bias-causing heuristics on the formation of an opportunity
recognition belief, I rely on McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) conceptual model of
entrepreneurial action. This model suggests that information reduces uncertainty and allows
entrepreneurs to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity. As noted above, I
exclusively consider the cognitive process related to forming the belief that one has recognized
an opportunity for the willing and able (a third-person opportunity) and not the evaluation
process related to recognizing an opportunity for himself or herself (a first-person opportunity)
(McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Recognizing a third-person opportunity is a necessary but not
sufficient step in recognizing a first-person opportunity. Although the cognitive process related
to recognizing an opportunity for oneself is an interesting question for future consideration,
research has shown that the cognitive processes related to third-person and first-person
opportunities differ (Gregoire, Barr, & Shepherd, 2010a; Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012; Haynie,
Shepherd, & McMullen, 2009). Thus, for the purpose of this project, I solely focus on the
cognitive process related to the first step in the opportunity recognition process, the formation of
the belief that one has recognized an opportunity for the willing and able.
In examining this causal process, I rely on a dual-process theory of cognition, specifically
a default-interventionist model (Evans, 2007). Generally, this model suggests that people rely on
both an autonomous processing system (system 1) and an analytical processing system (system
3

2). The autonomous system is fast and typically thought to use a heuristic-type of processing.
Alternatively, the analytical system is slower and is typically thought to use both a reflective
level and an algorithmic level of processing (Evans, 2007). The reflective level is related to
differences in individual thinking dispositions that regulate behavior (e.g., how much
information is considered in making a decision) and is responsible for triggering the use of the
algorithmic level. Whereas, the algorithmic level is related to the cognitive ability (the
horsepower) that one has available when making decisions and is responsible for actually
determining the correct decision (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Further, this model suggests that
individuals first rely on their autonomous processing system (system 1), which requires little
cognitive effort to provide default judgments. Once a default judgment has been made, an
individual’s analytical processing system (system 2) may or may not intervene. If the analytical
system does intervene, it may override or endorse the autonomous system’s default judgment
(Evans, 2007).
A default-interventionist model provides multiple advantages in examining the process I
seek to consider. First, it describes the cognitive process through which bias-causing heuristics
inhibit the consideration of information and in doing so reduces the likelihood of forming an
opportunity recognition belief. Further, this model provides a strong theoretical justification that
points to two individual differences that should alleviate the negative effect that bias-causing
heuristics have on the consideration of information. Specifically, I consider the need for
cognition and entrepreneurial alertness, both of which have been associated with higher levels of
reflective cognitive processing (Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Stanovich, 2009a). Thus, when initially
4

relying on a bias-causing heuristic, individuals high in each of these individual differences are
more likely to shift from their fast processing style to a slower, more deliberate processing style,
allowing them to overcome the bias-causing heuristic. This shift, in turn, should allow these
individuals to consider additional information about an opportunity and therefore be more likely
to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity when initially relying on a biascausing heuristic.
I test my theory with an experimental design that uses a product from a technology
transfer office that has been licensed by entrepreneurs and applied to a real-world market. This
allows me to isolate the underlying variables of interest and to affix my theorizing to a welldocumented phenomenon (the licensing and application of tech-transfer technology/products by
entrepreneurs) (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012; Mowery, 2004; Shane, 2001). These features of my
research provide a strong case for determining the causal sequence of the process and the
external validly of my theorizing (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012).
The major contribution of my study is to examine the theoretical underpinnings as to why
certain types of heuristics (bias-causing heuristics) inhibit entrepreneurs from forming the belief
that they have recognized an opportunity. Specifically, I suggest that bias-causing heuristics
reduce the amount of information that entrepreneurs consider about an opportunity and, as such,
inhibit opportunity recognition beliefs. Second, I propose two individual differences that have
been associated with higher levels of reflective cognitive processing (entrepreneurial alertness
and the need for cognition) as first stage moderators to this process. Specifically, I suggest that
these reflective individuals are likely to shift to a deliberate cognitive style that increases their
5

chances of forming an opportunity recognition belief because they consider more information
about the opportunity. Overall, I hope to point out that although a heuristic-dependent processing
style has been shown to be beneficial with regard to opportunity recognition (Baron, 2004), the
failure to consider the downside of certain heuristics and benefits related to overcoming these
heuristics may limit our understanding of the opportunity recognition process.
Theory and Hypotheses
The goal of this research project is to consider how the use of certain cognitive heuristics
affects opportunity recognition beliefs through the consideration of information. Generally, I rely
on a dual process theory of cognition, particularly a default-interventionist model, to discuss the
influence that these bias-causing cognitive heuristics have on the consideration of information
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013). I also rely on a theory of entrepreneurial action to discuss how
information influences opportunity recognition belief (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). In the
following sections, I first discuss opportunity recognition and lay out key assumptions related to
the construct. Then I more thoroughly detail the specific types of heuristics that I am
considering. Next, I discuss how these cognitive heuristics influence the consideration of
information. Finally, I explain how the consideration of information affects the formation of an
opportunity recognition belief. Once I have discussed the indirect effect that these bias-causing
cognitive heuristics have on opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of
information, I consider two key individual differences (the need for cognition and
entrepreneurial alertness) that moderate the first stage of this indirect effect. Specifically, I
suggest that when faced with contexts that trigger these bias-causing heuristics, individuals high
6

in each of these differences are more likely to consider information and thus form the belief that
they have recognized an opportunity. A graphical depiction of my theoretical model is presented
in Figure 1.
Opportunity Recognition Belief
Opportunity recognition belief is the outcome variable that I focus on in this dissertation.
The conceptualization of opportunity recognition is an important and central focus to the study of
entrepreneurship (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Nicolaou, Shane, Cherkas, & Spector, 2009). However,
significant conceptual debate exists regarding whether opportunities are discovered or created
(Gregoire et al., 2010b; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). I adopt Gregoire and colleagues’ (2010)
conceptualization of opportunity recognition belief, which attempts to integrate both views and
transcend this debate, as my dependent variable. This conceptualization is represented by the
subjective level of certainty that an entrepreneur has regarding a potential opportunity for the
willing and able (someone) (Gregoire et al., 2010b). Further, I propose that the effect that biascausing heuristics have on forming the belief that one has recognized and opportunity is equally
applicable to both conceptualizations (discovery/created) of an opportunity. Below, I discuss the
ongoing debate regarding opportunity recognition generally and more fully detail Gregoire and
colleagues’ (2010) conceptualization of opportunity recognition belief.
Generally, theories of discovery assume that disruptions in efficient markets arise from
external shocks (e.g., technology changes) and create real opportunities. These opportunities are
thought to objectively exist independent of entrepreneurs that may perceive them (Kirzner, 1973;
Shane, 2003; Shane, & Venkataraman, 2000). From, this perspective, because opportunities
7

objectively exist, information can be gathered about them to determine their possible outcomes
and the probability of each outcome. From a discovery perspective, decisions associated with
opportunity recognition are risky (i.e., possible outcomes and the probability of each outcome
can be determined) but not uncertain from a knightian perspective (i.e., information to determine
possible outcomes and their likelihood does not exist) (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Knight, 1921).
Alternatively, creation theorists propose that opportunities do not objectively exist independent
of the actions that entrepreneurs take to create them. Instead, entrepreneurs’ actions and
interactions with the environment are thought to create opportunities (Alvarez & Barney, 2007;
Alvarez, Barney, & Anderson, 2013; Baker & Nelson, 2005; Sarasvathy, 2001). Thus, from a
creation perspective, because opportunities do not exist until entrepreneurs act, information
about all of the possible outcomes and the probabilities associated with each outcome cannot be
determined ex ante. Therefore, creation theorists propose that decisions associated with
opportunity recognition are uncertain from a knightian perspective (Alvarez & Barney, 2007).
Recent research, however, has attempted to transcend these conceptual positions and has
suggested a more integrative view of opportunity recognition (Gregoire et al., 2010b; McMullen
& Shepherd, 2006). Specifically, Gregoire and colleagues (2009) define an opportunity “as
projected courses of action to introduce (and profit from) new and/or improved supply-demand
combinations that seek to address market failure problems” (p. 117). This view adopts the notion
that entrepreneurial opportunities originate from failures of the market process, which suggests
that opportunities exist and are recognized (Arrow & Debreu, 1954; Dean & McMullen, 2007;
Eckhardt & Shane, 2003; Gregoire et al., 2010b; Kirzner, 1985, 1997). As noted by Gregoire and
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colleagues (2009), however, these market failures (i.e. lack of market efficiencies) are just the
origins of the opportunities and require the possibility of action on the part of the entrepreneur,
which is more consistent with the creation side of the conceptual debate (Drucker, 1985;
Venkataraman & Sarasvathy, 2001).
From this view, opportunities are not specifically about the supply side (i.e., the creation
of a technology) or the demand side (i.e., opportunities that exist in the current market). Instead
opportunities relate to the possibility of changing the demand side with the supply side (i.e.,
using a new technology to change the current market) (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012). Thus, this
view does not focus on discovery or creation of opportunities but instead on the “ex ante
interface between situation and action as individuals try to make sense of information signals that
could indicate opportunities” (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012, p. 756). That is, from a forwardlooking perspective, opportunities are about an entrepreneur realizing the actions that might
make a more efficient transaction possible when considering the parameters of the environment
(Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012).
This view assumes that opportunities are fundamentally uncertain becuase their actual
value can only be determined after the fact. In discussing uncertainty, however, this view adopts
Lipshitz and Strauss’ (1997) conceptualization of “uncertainty in the context of action [as] a
sense of doubt that blocks or delays action” (p. 150). This conceptualization of uncertainty is
inclusive and does not refer to a specific type of doubt but instead is conceptualized with regard
to its influence on action (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Thus whether conceptualized as
Knightian uncertainty (which is not susceptible to measurement and such unknowable) (Knight,
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1921) or risk (which is susceptible to measurement) (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986), this
conceptualization of uncertainty prevents action (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Further, as the
actual value of opportunities can only be determined after the fact, the recognition of
opportunities relies on subjective views and possible projections (what could be) based on some
environmental stimuli. The actual potential for opportunities, however, is rooted in objective
information and market failure dynamics (i.e. lack of market efficiencies) . Thus, opportunity
recognition “rests on the subjective perception and interpretation of objective realities” (Gregoire
et al., 2010b, p. 118).
This view of opportunity recognition also adopts McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) twostage model of entrepreneurial action, which suggests that third-person opportunities (forming
the belief that there is an opportunity for someone) are conceptually and empirically different
than first-person opportunities (an opportunity for me) (Dimov, 2007; Gregoire & Shepherd,
2012; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Specifically, identifying a third-person opportunity relates
to the recognition that there is an opportunity for someone, whereas identifying a first-person
opportunity relates to an individual’s willingness to bear the uncertainty associated with
exploiting the third-person opportunity. Evidence has suggested that the cognitive processes
associated with third-person opportunities and first-person opportunities are different and that the
measures of each are distinct (Gregoire et al., 2010a; Gregoire et al., 2010b; Gregoire &
Shepherd, 2012; Haynie et al., 2009).
Based on these distinctions, opportunity recognition is concerned with subjective beliefs
that a third-person opportunity exists (an opportunity for someone) (Gregoire et al., 2010b;
10

Shepherd, McMullen, & Jennings, 2007). McMullen and Shepherd (2006) have noted that
uncertainty acts to undermine these beliefs. This leads to the above noted conception of
opportunity recognition belief that is represented by the subjective level of certainty that an
entrepreneur has regarding a potential opportunity for the willing and able (someone) (Gregoire
et al., 2010b).
Heuristics
Simon (1990) argued that heuristics are “methods for arriving at satisfactory solutions
with modest amounts of computation,” suggesting that heuristics are a way in which people
reduce their effort and save time when making decisions (p. 11). Heuristics have been noted to
reduce effort by allowing people to examine fewer pieces of information and by reducing the
difficulty associated with retrieving and storing information (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).
Heuristics are often thought to be accurate and thus generally appear to be useful in decisionmaking (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).
The usefulness of some heuristics has been explored in the entrepreneurship literature.
Specifically, research has suggested that entrepreneurs are more likely to use heuristics than nonentrepreneurs and that the use of some heuristics is beneficial to entrepreneurs (Baron 1998,
2004; Baron & Ward, 2004; Busentiz, 1999; Busenitz & Barney 1997; Zahra et al., 2005). In
fact, heuristic-type thinking and the use of accurate, well-refined prototypes have been noted to
be advantageous with regard to opportunity recognition (Baron, 2004; Baron & Ensley, 2006;
Baron & Ward, 2004). More specifically, Baron and Ensley (2006) noted that some
entrepreneurs possess well-refined business opportunity prototypes and as such are likely to
11

recognize opportunities when products, services, and other environmental attributes and patterns
match these prototypes, whereas, not possessing these prototypes likely leads to overlooking
such opportunities.
Heuristics-based processing, however, is not without flaws. Specifically, there is a
substantial literature in psychology that has shown some heuristics lead to cognitive biases and
systematic errors (Kahneman, 2011). The entrepreneurship literature has also noted that these
bias-causing heuristics have potentially negative effects on the ability to recognize opportunities
(Ucbasaran, Westhead, & Wright, 2009). The potentially negative effects related to these
heuristics, however, have received far less attention than the benefits associated with heuristics
generally. Further, the underlying causal process through which these heuristics negatively affect
the ability to recognize opportunities has not been considered. Thus, for the purpose of this
dissertation, I focus on these bias-causing heuristics that negatively affect the ability to form an
opportunity recognition belief. In the next section, I briefly list some of the most common
heuristics and resulting biases and then more thoroughly discuss the way in which three of these
heuristics (representativeness, affect, and betrayal) lead to biased decisions.
Bias-causing heuristic
Bias-causing heuristics have a long tradition in the psychology literature. Kahneman and
Tversky’s research program on heuristic and bias has shown these types of heuristics result in
systematically inaccurate judgments (Kahneman, 2011). Common biases that systematically
result from these heuristics include erase of recall and retrievability caused by the availability
heuristic; insensitivity to base rates, insensitivity to sample size, misconception of chance,
12

regression to the mean, and the conjunction fallacy caused by the representativeness heuristic;
and the confirmation trap, anchoring, conjunctive, and disjunctive event bias, overconfidence
and hind sight/the curse of knowledge caused by the confirmation heuristic (see Bazerman &
Moore, 2012, for a review). Other heuristics that have been shown to systematically bias
decisions include the affect heuristic, the outrage heuristic, and the betrayal heuristic (Bazerman
& Moore, 2012; Kahneman, 2011, Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, 1998; Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002; Sunstein 2003, 2005). A more thorough description of these and other biascausing heuristics are provided in Appendix O and a review of the literature where heuristics
have been applied to entrpeneurship is provided in Appendix P.
So, why would these heuristics systematically lead to biased, non-rational, and inaccurate
judgments? The well-documented research program on heuristics and biases has suggested that
these errors often occur due to attribute substitution, where automatically computed attributes
provide answers to different questions than the one actually being considered (Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002). In this case, “judgment is mediated by a heuristic when an individual assesses a
specified target attribute of a judgment object by substituting another property of that object —
the heuristic attribute— which comes more readily to mind” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p.
4). This substitution inevitably leads to a systematic bias because “the target attribute and the
heuristic attribute are different” (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, p. 5).
This type of heuristic-based attribute substitution affects all types of decisions and
judgments. Consider the following classic example that is based on the representativeness
heuristic where participants are told, “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright.
13

She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination
and social justice and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.” (Tversky & Kahneman,
1983, p. 297). Participants are then asked the probability of different scenarios for Linda.
Scenarios include descriptions such as “Linda is a teacher at an elementary school.” More
importantly, two of the scenarios note, “Linda is a bank teller” and “Linda is a bank teller and is
active in the feminist movement.” Interestingly, the great majority of people find that Linda is
more likely to be a bank teller and active in the feminist movement than just a bank teller. This,
of course, is a mathematical impossibility because if Linda is a bank teller and active in the
feminist movement, by definition, she is also a bank teller. Thus, the probability of her being a
bank teller could not be less than the probability of her being a bank teller and active in the
feminist movement. In this case, people appear to answer the question “[h]ow representative is
Linda of a feminist bank teller?” instead of how likely Linda is to be a bank teller or a feminist
bank teller (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008, p. 216).i
Another example of a well-documented heuristic that is based on attribute substitution is
the affect heuristic (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). In the case of the affect heuristic, decision
makers may focus on how they feel about something, whether they like it or not, instead of
answering the underlying question, which may be, “Will she be a good employee?” or “Is this a
good investment?” (Kahneman, 2011). Kahneman (2011) provided an example where tens of
millions of dollars were invested by a CIO of a large financial firm based on the affect heuristic.
In that case, the CIO made the multimillion-dollar investment in Ford stock not because a
detailed economic analysis led him to believe that the stock was underpriced but because he
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liked the company. While it is true that well-liked companies are often successful in the market,
it is doubtful that anyone would hire a financial advisor who bases his or her investment
decisions on which companies he or she personally likes, with no formal or rational analysis.
Attribute substitution also appears to be related to the betrayal heuristic, which I will
focus on and operationalize in this paper. The betrayal heuristic appears closely tied to the affect
heuristic and is a rule of thumb where people, “Punish, and do not reward, betrayals of trust”
(Sunstein, 2005, p. 537; Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman, 2010). That is, it seems that
when people are making judgments about things that include a betrayal, they answer the
question, “Does this betray?” as opposed to the underlying question (e.g., What punishment does
this person deserve? or Which product is better?). For example, Koehler and Gershoff (2003)
showed that people punished identical criminal offenses significantly more when they also
involved betrayal (e.g., people punished a security guard more than a janitor in regard to a bank
robbery and a day-care worker more than a grocery clerk in regard to child molestation).
The effect of the betrayal heuristic is not limited to punishment or even to people.
Koehler and Gershoff (2003) have also shown that this heuristic relates to decisions about
products. Specifically, they gave participants the option to purchase car A that was equipped
with an airbag (that would not cause death) where the chance of death from a serious crash was
2% or car B that was equipped with an airbag (that would cause death an additional .01% of the
time) where the chance of death from a serious crash was 1%. In this case, the rational choice is
clearly Car B (i.e., the car that is equipped with the airbag that causes death an additional .01%
of the time) as the overall chance of death associated with Car B was 1.01%, whereas Car A (i.e.,
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the car that is equipped with the airbag that does not cause death) has an overall chance of death
of 2% of the time. Interestingly, more than two-thirds of participants choose car A, suggesting
that people are willing to “double their overall chance of dying to avoid incurring a very small
chance of dying via betrayal” (Koehler and Gershoff, 2003, p. 255). In this case, the betrayal is
that a product that is supposed to protect you ends up killing you. Thus, as noted above, it
appears that participants focused on how they felt about the car as opposed to which car was
better/safer.
Bias-causing heuristics and the decision to consider additional information
It is important to note that I am specifically focusing on the effect that these bias-causing
heuristics have on opportunity recognition belief. In particular, I propose that the use of these
types of heuristics negatively affects the ability to form an opportunity recognition belief and that
this effect is mediated by the consideration of information. More specifically, I suggest that the
use of these heuristics reduces the amount of information considered, which in turn, reduces the
ability to form the belief that one has recognized an opportunity. Further, I suggest that some
individuals are less likely to be affected by these bias-causing heuristics. I acknowledge,
however, that in some situations, some bias-causing heuristics could lead to the consideration of
more information. These situations, however, are less interesting in regard to the outcome
variable because they likely lead to the same prediction regardless of whether the bias occurs.
That is, in these situations, entrepreneurs likely form the same opportunity recognition belief
regardless of the bias-causing heuristic being activated.
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For example, the affect heuristic could lead a potential entrepreneur to consider
additional information about a very bad/nonexistent opportunity. Consider the following
example. If a potential entrepreneur has the ability to sell snow cone ice to Eskimos (who for the
purposes of this dissertation we can assume would obviously have no interest in snow cone ice),
a heuristically biased entrepreneur who loves snow cones might consider additional information
about the opportunity. A non-heuristically biased entrepreneur, however, would likely decline
additional information. In this case, I suggest the biased entrepreneur might be answering the
question “How do I feel about this opportunity?” as opposed to “What do I think about it?” The
consideration of additional disconfirming information, however, would likely lead the biased
entrepreneur to realize there was no opportunity for anyone. That is, when the biased
entrepreneur learned that Eskimos have no interest in buying snow cone ice, the heuristically
biased entrepreneur would likely realize what the non-heuristically biased entrepreneur had
previously realized: there was no opportunity. In the situation where bias-causing heuristics leads
to less information being considered, however, I predict that heuristically biased and nonheuristically biased entrepreneurs will differ regarding the belief that they have recognized an
opportunity. Thus, the rest of this dissertation will focus on situations where bias-causing
heuristics lead to less information being considered. For the ease of illustration, I will
specifically focus on heuristics that I posit always lead to less information being considered such
as the betrayal heuristic.
I specifically chose to use the betrayal heuristic because it squarely fits into the types of
bias-causing heuristics that I seek to consider, because it constitutes a strong manipulation and
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because it was easily adapted to the context I seek to explore in this dissertation. More
specifically, the betrayal heuristic is the type of heuristic that systematically leads to non-rational
and inaccurate decisions. This heuristic is also the type of heuristic that pushes people away from
the stimuli. In an opportunity recognition context this should cause participants to consider less
information about a business opportunity, which as noted above are the situations I exclusively
seek to consider. Further, after pretesting multiple heuristic manipulations, betrayal consistently
proved to be the strongest manipulation, which is important for the type of experimental design
that I employ in both of my studies. Lastly, the betrayal heuristic was easily adapted in an
understandable way to the entrepreneurial setting.
Bias-causing heuristics and the decision to consider less information
Heuristics research has also examined specific heuristics that relate to the way in which
people search for and consider information (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). These heuristics are
rules of thumb that people typically use in determining how they search for information (e.g.,
one may always stop collecting information after he or she has seen two confirming pieces of
information (Karelaia, 2006)). These specific heuristics, however, are outside the purview of this
paper, as they are rules of thumb regarding the process that an individual uses when considering
information after deciding to consider information and not rules of thumb that affect the decision
to consider information. These types of heuristics, however, show that individuals may only use
a small amount of the information available when making judgments (Shah & Oppenheimer,
2008). In fact, some suggest that individuals may only consider a single piece of information
when making a judgment (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).
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Considering less information is in line with heuristics being an effort-reduction tool
(Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Relying on, “how I feel about a company?” as compared to, “is
this a good investment?” reduces time and effort in making a judgment in much the same way
relying on a single piece of information is faster and easier than considering all of the
information available in a compensatory manner (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). Thus, it seems
likely that judgments based on bias-causing heuristics (i.e., determining that an investment is bad
because one does not personally like it) may also lead individuals to reduce their effort and
consider less information. Thus, I suggest that when entrepreneurs rely on bias-causing
heuristics, they are more likely to make systematically inaccurate judgments that reduce the
likelihood of considering additional information about an opportunity. Formally hypothesized as:
Hypothesis 1. Relying on bias-causing heuristics reduces the amount of information
considered related to an opportunity.
The Consideration of Information and Opportunity Recognition Belief
Information has also been related to the conceptualization of opportunity recognition
belief that I adhere to in this paper, the subjective level of certainty that an entrepreneur has
regarding a potential opportunity for someone (i.e. the willing and able ) (Gregoire et al., 2010a).
In fact, the entrepreneurship literature has suggested that the discriminating feature between an
entrepreneur who recognizes a third-person opportunity and one who does not is knowledge and
relevant information (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2007). Specifically, the
literature has suggested that information about the environment and relevant knowledge reduce
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uncertainty, allowing entrepreneurs to overcome ignorance, enabling them to form the belief that
they have recognized an opportunity (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2007).
Generally, the literature appears consistent in noting the importance of information and
suggests that individuals who have better access to, or a superior ability to utilize, information
are better able to recognize opportunity (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Shane, 2003). Thus, I suggest by
considering more information, potential entrepreneurs are more likely to form the belief that they
have recognized an opportunity. Formally hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The amount of information considered related to an opportunity is positively
related to opportunity recognition belief.
Taken together, Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest that relying on bias-causing heuristics has a
negative, indirect effect on forming the belief that one has recognized an opportunity.
Specifically, I propose that relying on bias-causing heuristics reduces the amount of information
that an entrepreneur considers about an opportunity, which in turn reduces the likelihood of
forming the belief that the entrepreneur has recognized an opportunity. Formally hypothesized as
follows:
Hypothesis 3. The amount of information considered mediates the negative relationship
between the reliance on bias-causing heuristics and the likelihood of forming an opportunity
recognition belief.
Individual Differences That May Help Individuals Overcome Heuristic-Based Biases
Recently, many psychologists have adopted a dual process approach that helps explain
the existence and use of heuristics. This dual process approach argues that humans rely on two
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distinct types of information processing systems (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999;
Sloman, 1996). Each system has been referred to in many different ways, but for the purpose of
this dissertation, I will use the most widely used descriptors, system 1 and system 2.
System 1 is often thought to be the older of the two systems from an evolutionary
perspective (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Epstein, 1994; Reber, 1992). It involves the seamlessly
effortless and automatic learning and processing of information (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Stanovich
& West, 2000). Evans and Stanovich (2013) have suggested its defining features are that it does
not require working memory, and that it operates autonomously. It is typically associated with
being fast, non-conscious, contextualized, automatic, independent of cognitive ability, and biased
(Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
System 2 is thought to be more deliberate and allows for intentional learning,
development, and analysis of ideas (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Evans and Stanovich (2013) have
suggested its defining features are that it requires working memory and that it involves cognitive
decoupling, hypothetical thinking, and mental stimulation. It is typically associated with being
slower, controllable, providing normative responses, being conscious, and using consequential
decision-making (Evans & Stanovich, 2013).
Generically, dual process approaches suggest the use of distinct cognitive and
neurological systems; however, there are different interpretations as to how these distinctive
systems work together (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). I rely on a defaultinterventionist theory that suggests a fast autonomous process (system 1) provides initial
responses and that the slower analytic process (system 2) acts as a check and may or may not
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intervene (Evans, 2007, 2008; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Put another
way:
Heuristic process often cue default mental models that imply—with only shallow
analytic processing of the task requirements—default responses, inference or
decisions. Analytic processes may or may not intervene in order to revise or
replace such default models and to inhibit default heuristic responding. (Evans,
2007, p. 329)
From a default-interventionist perspective, heuristic biases would occur when system 2
(the analytical process) does not intervene and override system 1 (the heuristic process) errors
(Evans, 2008). Thus, individuals who are more able and/or likely to shift to and use their
analytical processes would be less likely to make heuristic-based errors.ii
As briefly discussed above, the cognitive process that leads to overriding system 1 default
judgments is best understood when viewing system 2 as containing, “two levels of processing—
the algorithmic level and the reflective level” (Stanovich, 2009a, p. 57). The difference between
these levels of processing can be understood by considering differences between measures of
thinking dispositions and cognitive ability. Measures of cognitive ability are related to the
algorithmic processes’ ability, “to sustain decoupled representations” and is largely related to
measures of general intelligence (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Alternatively, the reflective process
operates “to set the goal agenda or …. in the service of epistemic regulation (i.e., to direct the
sequence of information pickup)” (Stanovich, 2009a, p. 66-67). Measures of thinking
dispositions, which are related to the reflective process, are less related to general intelligences
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and are, “higher level regulatory states of the reflective mind” (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p.
230). These higher-level regulatory states include:
the tendency to collect information before making up one’s mind, the tendency to
seek various points of view before coming to a conclusion, the disposition to think
extensively about a problem before responding, the tendency to calibrate the
degree of strength of one’s opinion to the degree of evidence available, the
tendency to think about future consequences before taking action, and the
tendency to explicitly weigh pluses and minuses of situations before making a
decision. (Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 230)
Evans and Stanovich (2013) have suggested that system 1 is overridden by the
algorithmic processing of system 2 but that the reflective processing of system 2 causes the
override itself. That is, the reflective level of processing is responsible for the shift itself, and the
algorithmic level is related to the mental ability needed to analyze information and determine if
the heuristic-based judgment is correct. Thus, the likelihood that system 2 will override system 1
is based on both individuals’ cognitive ability and thinking disposition, but the initial override is
likely initiated by thinking dispositions (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). For a more thorough
discussion on this topic, please see Evans and Stanovich (2013) and Stanovich (2009a, 2009b,
2011).
In this context, where I suggest that a bias-causing heuristic leads to the decision to not
consider additional information, individual cognitive ability would likely allow (provide the
mental horsepower) entrepreneurs to determine if the decision to not consider additional
23

information (system 1’s decision) was an error. I am more interested, however, in individual
differences that allow a potential entrepreneur to override his or her initial intuitive system 1
decision to not consider more information, which is what is responsible for the use of the
individual cognitive ability in the first place. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, I focus on
individual differences that relate to the reflective level of processing. Specifically, I focus on two
individual differences. First, I consider the need for cognition, a rational thinking disposition that
relates to an increased reflective level of processing. Second, I consider entrepreneurial alertness.
This construct is typically associated with the increased use of heuristic-based processing but is
also related to an increased sensitivity to information that does not conform to heuristic
responses and the adjustment of such responses (Gaglio & Katz, 2001). Thus, it should also
relate to an increased reflective level of processing.
The need for cognition
Within the dual process literature, the need for cognition has been noted to be an
individual difference at the intentional level and associated with the increased use of reflective
processing (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, Blair, & Jarvis, 1996; Stanovich, 2009a). Thus, it likely
leads to the reassessment of initial decisions based on bias-causing heuristics and the potential
overriding of an initial inaccurate heuristic-based judgment.
Research on the need for cognition most notably comes from Cacioppo and Petty (1982),
who suggest that people differ in how much they enjoy and engage in effortful cognitive activity.
They suggest that both high- and low-need for cognition individuals seek to make sense of the
world around them; however, these individuals tend to go about this in different ways (Cacioppo,
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Kao, Petty, & Rodriguez, 1986; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo et al., 1996; Cacioppo, Petty,
& Morris, 1983). Individuals with a high need for cognition seek out, think about, thoroughly
process, and reflect back on information to make sense of stimuli and the world around them.
Alternatively, individuals with a low need for cognition are more likely to rely on simple cues
and others’ opinions and use cognitive heuristics (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Kearney, Gebert, &
Voelpel, 2009; Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009). This would suggest that compared to
low need for cognition individuals, high need for cognition individuals may be more reflective
because they are less resistant to mental work and as such are more willing to shift to and use
their analytical system. Thus, in the case where a bias-causing heuristic is triggered, high need
for cognition individuals who are less resistant to using their analytical system should be more
able to avoid making an inaccurate judgment. This assertion appears to be supported in the
literature, as it has been shown that high need for cognition individuals are more likely to
“correct or adjust their judgments for biasing factors than …. individuals low in need for
cognition” (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Martin, 1986; Strack, 1992).
In regard to the indirect effect that bias-causing heuristics have on opportunity
recognition beliefs through the consideration of information, I suggest that high need for
cognition entrepreneurs are more likely to override heuristic-based judgments, consider
additional information, and form an opportunity recognition belief when they encounter a biascausing heuristic. Alternatively, this indirect relationship should be weaker or non-existent when
no bias-causing heuristic is present. This is because when no bias-causing heuristic is present,
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low need for cognition individuals do not have a simple cue that suggests they should not
consider additional information to rely on. Formally hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 4. Entrepreneurs’ need for cognition moderates the first stage of the indirect
effect that relying on bias-causing heuristics has on opportunity recognition belief via the
amount of information considered, such that the indirect effect is weaker for
entrepreneurs with high levels of need for cognition.
Entrepreneurial alertness
Entrepreneurial alertness is often discussed as the ability to notice opportunities without
search and has been related to having accurate mental models and schemas that appear to be in
line with using heuristic-based processing (Baron, 2004; Gaglio & Katz, 2001). Thus, it seems
that alert entrepreneurs tend to rely on accurate heuristics. Alert entrepreneurs are also more
likely to adjust their mental models to incorporate new information (Gaglio & Katz, 2001). In
doing so, they are able to shift from a heuristic-based processing style to an analytical processing
style and override their initial inaccurate heuristic-based judgments. Thus, alert individuals also
appear to be more reflective in their processing style. This view is in line with Kizner’s (1974)
original definitions of the construct. Specifically, Kizner (1979) defined the construct in two
different ways: first, as “the ability to notice without search opportunities that have hitherto been
overlooked” (p. 49) and second as “a motivated propensity of man to formulate an image of the
future” (Kirzner, 1985, p. 56). While the first definition does appear to be related to heuristicbased thinking (system 1), the second involves the motivation to think hypothetically, which is
clearly related to the analytical system (system 2). Specifically, the motivation to think
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hypothetically relates to the reflective process of the analytical system, and thinking
hypothetically is associated with the algorithmic process of the analytic system (Evans &
Stanovich, 2013).
Based on Kizner’s work, Gaglio (2001) has noted that the crucial difference between
opportunity finders and non-finders is their ability to accurately perceive reality as well as
potential implications and consequences of actions. That is, the more accurately a potential
entrepreneur can perceive the environment, the more likely he or she will be able to determine if
existing products and services are working and the potential for an opportunity (Gaglio & Katz,
2001). Thus, alert entrepreneurs may possess complex and accurate models of what a successful
opportunity looks like and as such they are able to easily notice such opportunities (Baron, 2004;
Baron & Ensley, 2006). These mental models/heuristics, however, are not innate but instead
refined over time and through the use of the analytical system (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Evans &
Stanovich, 2013; Gaglio & Katz, 2001). Thus, I would suggest that alert entrepreneurs have more
accurate mental models/heuristics because they are better able to refine them.
Gaglio and colleagues (2001) also suggest that alert individuals are particularly good at
reassessing their current heuristics. They suggest that alert individuals emphasize objective
accuracy (Gaglio & Katz, 2001). The goal of objective accuracy certainly falls within the
purview of the reflective process of the analytical system. Because of this focus on objective
accuracy, alert entrepreneurs are more likely to notice when things are “unusual, unexpected, or
anomalous” and then realize that the most appropriate behavior may require the reassessment of
their schema (Gaglio & Katz, 2001 p. 103). From a default-interventionist perspective, this
27

means that alert individuals are more likely to use the reflective process of their analytical
system to initiate a system 1 override and allow the algorithmic process of the analytic system to
reevaluate the heuristic-based judgment. This reevaluation by system 2 could lead to the
endorsement or overriding of the heuristic system’s original judgment (Evans, 2008). If the
heuristic-based judgment is endorsed, this confirms the accuracy of the heuristic and likely leads
to its continued use (unchanged). Alternatively, if the heuristic-based judgment is not endorsed,
the heuristic will likely be adjusted and perform better in the future. Either way, an increased use
of the reflective process may explain why alert individuals have particularly accurate mental
models.
From a dual process perspective, it seems that alert entrepreneurs, more so than non-alert
entrepreneurs, often rely on an accurate heuristics processing style (system 1) but also appear
more likely to recognize situations where their heuristics are not appropriate and in these
situations shift to a more analytical processing style (system 2). Thus, for the purposes of this
paper, I suggest that alert entrepreneurs are less likely to make the initial inaccurate heuristicsbased judgment that they are not interested in considering additional information. This is because
their heuristics are typically more accurate. When alert entrepreneurs do make an inaccurate
heuristic-based judgment, however, I suggest they are more likely to override the initial
heuristic-based judgments, consider additional information, and form an opportunity recognition
belief. Formally hypothesized as follows:
Hypothesis 5. Entrepreneurs’ alertness moderates the first stage of the indirect effect that
relying on bias-causing heuristics has on opportunity recognition belief via the amount of
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information considered, such that the indirect effect is weaker for entrepreneurs with
high levels of alertness.
Method
In testing my hypotheses, I conducted two studies. The first study used two collections
and considered the underlying causal process through which bias-causing heuristics reduce the
ability to form the belief that one has recognized an opportunity through the consideration of
information (hypotheses 1-3). In study 1 I used both a measurement of mediation approach
(collection 1) and an experimental causal chain approach (collection 2) to explore this causal
process. The second study further considered the mediated relationship and examined
entrepreneurial alertness and the need for cognition as first stage moderators to this indirect
effect (hypotheses 3-5). I used a between participant experimental design and actual
entrepreneurs to examine these effects and further bolster the generalizability of Study 1.
Study 1
Study 1 used a between participant experimental-causal-chain design paired with a
measurement of mediation approach (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Specifically, I used two
experiments to establish the effect of independent variable (X) on a dependent variable (Y)
through a mediator (M). The first experiment considered the relationship between the
independent variable (the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic) and the mediator (the
consideration of information). The first experiment also tested the indirect relationship between
the independent variable (the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic) and the dependent variable
(opportunity recognition belief) through the mediator (the consideration of information). The
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second experiment then considered the relationship between the mediator (the consideration of
information) and the dependent variable (the formation of an opportunity recognition belief).
Procedure for collection 1 of Study 1
In collection 1, I considered both the relationship between the reliance on a bias-causing
heuristic and the consideration of information (XM) as well as the indirect effect that the
reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has on forming an opportunity recognition belief though the
consideration of information (X—MY). Although collection 1 tested mediation because both
the mediating variable and the dependent variable were measured variables, directionality was
difficult to establish. Thus, the second collection extended the findings of collection 1 by using
an experimental manipulation to consider the effect that the consideration of information has on
the formation of an opportunity recognition belief (MY).
Both collection 1 and collection 2 relied on the application of a real technology, from a
tech-transfer office, to a market that it was actually applied to. Specifically, participants were
given information about the application of a low-temperature oxidation catalyst filter technology
(hereafter referred to as “the technology”) to the personal safety market. This technology was
originally developed at NASA’s Langley Research Center for carbon dioxide laser research.
Smoke Mask, Inc. then applied this technology to personal safety through their personal escape
hood that allowed for respiratory protection when escaping hazardous conditions. Applying a
tech-transfer technology to a new market closely adheres to Gregoire and colleagues’ (2009)
definition of an opportunity, “as projected courses of action to introduce (and profit from) new
and/or improved supply-demand combinations that seek to address market failure problems.” (p.
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117). Specifically, the application of the technology to the personal safety market provided a new
and possibly better way to solve homeowners’ demands for a home-based fire safety product, a
need that the market had failed to fully meet. Using the application of a real technology from a
tech-transfer office is also in line with prior research that has asked entrepreneurs to look at the
applicability of a tech transfer technology to a potential market (Gregoire & Shepherd, 2012;
Shane, 2001).
Sample for Collection 1 of Study 1
I tested the first link of the indirect relationship by having student participants at a large
southeastern university identify a non-student participant. Student participants were awarded
extra credit for identifying a non-student participant. Non-student participants then completed an
online survey that was provided to them via email. Sixty-four non-student participants completed
the survey. I removed nine cases (14%) where respondents did not understand the manipulation
(specifically cases were removed where participants did not correctly indicate whether the
product that they read about caused death, see below manipulation). My final sample was
comprised of 55 non-student adult participants. Of the 55 participants, 31% were male; on
average, they were 40 years old; and they were 58% Caucasian/White. Further, 26% had
previously founded a business, and 42% of the entire sample including those who had previously
founded a business noted they intended to found a business.
Procedure for Collection 1
For collection 1, I created vignettes to test hypotheses 1 and 3, which propose that the
reliance on a bias-causing heuristic negatively impacts the consideration of information and that
the amount of information considered mediates the negative relationship between the reliance on
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bias-causing heuristics and the likelihood of forming an opportunity recognition belief,
respectively. I used different descriptions about the technology market combination that either
primed a strong bias-causing heuristic or did not. As discussed above, I relied on the betrayal
heuristic, which is a rule of thumb where people, “Punish, and do not reward, betrayals of trust”
(Sunstein, 2005, p. 537). As noted above I chose to use the betrayal heuristic because it squarely
fits into the types of bias-causing heuristics that I seek to consider, because it constitutes a strong
manipulation and because it was easily adapted to the context I seek to explore in this
dissertation. In creating my manipulation, I closely followed the wording that Koehler and
colleagues (2003) used. Specifically, in my manipulation, participants were told:
Researchers at a large university created low-temperature oxidation catalyst filters
to convert carbon monoxide to nontoxic carbon dioxide. The inventors of this
technology did not want to personally pursue business opportunities because they
are purely scientists. This technology is now part of a university’s technology
transfer program that makes the technology available for a licensing deal with a
new or existing firm. One possible market that researchers suggested this
technology could be applied to is the fire safety and protection market through a
personal rescue hood. The university technology transfer office has done some
research related to the application of the technology to this market. We are asking
you as a potential entrepreneur to evaluate this potential opportunity. On the
next page we provide you with the executive summary about the opportunity, one
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piece of information at a time. Please explore as little or as much information
as you see fit.
On the following page, participants were provided with an executive summary regarding
the technology market combination one piece of information at a time. The first piece of
information following the above description contained the heuristic manipulation to which
participants were randomly assigned. Specifically, those in the high bias-causing heuristic
(betrayal) condition were told:
There is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire will be killed due to
smoke inhalation. Scientific tests indicate, however, that there is only a 1%
chance of death due to smoke inhalation when a personal rescue hood is used. The
rescue hood, however, may also kill some homeowners. Specifically, some rescue
hood users may die due to hood suffocation caused by the hood itself. Tests
indicate that there is an additional one chance in 200 (0.5%) that someone who is
in a serious fire, who uses the rescue hood, will be killed due to hood suffocation.
Whereas participants in the low bias-causing heuristic (no betrayal) condition were told:
There is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire will be killed due to
smoke inhalation. Scientific tests indicate, however, that there is only a 1.5%
chance of death due to smoke inhalation when a personal rescue hood is used. The
rescue hood, however, could also cause minor side effects such as a temporary
rash.
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It is notable that in both conditions, the chance of death when using the hood is reduced
from 5% to 1.5%. After viewing the manipulation participants were then asked to select one of
the following choices, “I would like more information” or “I do not want more information.” If
they selected “I would like more information,” an additional piece of non-heuristically charged
information about the opportunity appeared below the first piece of information, and participants
were asked if they wanted more information about the opportunity. This was repeated, such that
the maximum amount of information that could be collected was the manipulation (heuristically
charged/non-heuristically charged information) and four additional pieces of non-heuristically
charged information. If at any point a participant selected, “I do not want more information” or
after he or she had viewed all of the information available, they were no longer given any
information about the opportunity. Once participants finished collecting information, they were
asked to complete an opportunity recognition belief scale regarding the technology being applied
to the personal safety market.
Sample for Collection 2 of Study 1
I tested the second link of the indirect relationship by again having student participants at
a large southeastern university identify a non-student participant. Student participants were
awarded extra credit for identifying a non-student participant. Non-student participants then
completed an online survey that was provided to them via email. Two hundred and two nonstudent participants completed the survey. Of the 202 participants, 48% were male; on average,
they were 40 years old, and they were 66% Caucasian/White. Further, 25% had previously
founded a business, and 38% of the entire samples including those who had previously founded a
business noted they intended to found a business.
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Procedure for Collection 2
Collection 2, tested hypothesis 2 , which proposes that the amount of information
considered impacts the formation of an opportunity recognition belief. Instructions for this
collection were the same as the instructions for collection 1, except in this collection all
participants were told, “On the next page we provide you with the executive summary about the
opportunity. Please carefully consider all of the information provided.” Whereas in collection
1, all participants were told, “On the next page we provide you with the executive summary
about the opportunity, one piece of information at a time. Please explore as little or as much
information as you see fit. Participants were then provided, on a single page, information about
the opportunity. Participants were randomly assigned to the low or high information condition.
The low information condition provided two pieces of information about the opportunity and the
high information condition provided the same information as the low information condition plus
two additional pieces of information. After reviewing the information manipulation, participants
completed an opportunity recognition belief scale regarding the technology being applied to the
personal safety market. See Appendix M for a breakdown of the manipulation.
Measures for Collection 1 and Collection 2 of Study 1
Amount of information considered
I assessed the amount of information that participants considered with a count of the
number of pieces of information that they viewed. That is, if a participant selected, “I would not
like any more information” after viewing the manipulation (the first piece of information), he or
she received a score of one. If the participant selected, “I would like more information” after the
manipulation and then selected, “I would not like any more information” after viewing the
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second piece of information, he or she received a two and so on. If the participant viewed all
information available, he or she received a five.
Opportunity Recognition Belief
I assessed participants’ opportunity recognition belief with an adapted version of the measure
developed and validated by Gregoire et al. (2010b). Participants were asked to rate how certain
(0 = uncertain, 4 = completely certain) they were regarding the fit and the feasibility of the
technology market combination. Sample items included “The proposed business solution can be
used to solve the problems of the targeted market” and “The proposed business solution is
sufficiently developed to be applied with individuals/firms in the targeted markets.” The
reliability for this measure was .93 for Collection 1 and .84 for Collection 2.
Results for Pretests
Before testing my hypotheses of interest I followed Koehler and Gershoff’s (2003)
example and confirmed the effectiveness of my betrayal manipulation. Specifically, I presented a
pilot version of the manipulation to student and non-student participants and asked them on a 1
(definitely no) to 5 (definitely yes) scale if the personal rescue hood betrays the people it is
supposed to protect. Appendix O provides the earlier, slightly different, piloted version of the
manipulation and the one used in both Study 1 and Study 2. I then conducted an analysis of
variance on these ratings. The results indicated a significant main effect for my manipulation,
F(1, 269) 85.22, p < .001. The betrayal description received a significantly higher rating (M =
3.26) than the non-betrayal condition (M = 1.92) on the manipulation check question. Further, I
conducted the same manipulation check using the same question suggested by Koehler and
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Gershoff (2003) on the data collected for Collection 1 of Study 1. The analysis of variance on
these ratings also indicated a significant main effect for my manipulation, F(1, 54) 13.23, p
< .001. Specifically, the betrayal manipulation received a significantly higher rating (M = 2.64)
than the non-betrayal condition (M = 1.56) on the manipulation check question. Thus, my
betrayal manipulation appeared successful.
I also pretested the rationality of decision makers’ choices based on the existence of my
betrayal manipulation. Specifically, my studies employed a between participant design and did
not give participants the choice between a betrayal and a non-betrayal venture. Thus, in
following Koehler and Gershoff’s (2003) example, I used a within participant design to test the
likelihood of participants making a non-rational choice when given an option between two
ventures, one that reduced the chance of death by 3.5% but incorporated the betrayal heuristic
(the rational choice) and one that only reduced the chance of death by 3% but did not incorporate
the betrayal heuristic (the non-rational choice). Specifically, I gave participants the choice
between licensing Hood A (no betrayal) or licensing Hood B (betrayal). Hood A did not
incorporate the betrayal heuristic and reduced the chance of death in a serious fire from 5% to
2%. Alternatively, Hood B incorporated the betrayal heuristic and reduced the chance of death in
a serious fire from 5% to 1% but also caused death .5% of the time. Thus, licensing Hood B
(betrayal) was the more rational choice because it reduced the chance of death to 1.5% as
opposed to licensing Hood A (no betrayal) that only reduced the chance of death to 2%. A full
depiction of this manipulation is presented in Appendix P. Interestingly, when given the choice
between licensing these hoods, 70% of participants chose Hood A (no betrayal), the seemingly
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less rational venture. Notably, these findings are nearly identical to the results found by Koehler
and Gershoff (2003) when manipulating betrayal regarding safety products (airbag/fire
alarm/vaccine). Specifically, Koehler and Gershoff (2003) found that 67.4% of people chose a
non-betraying safety product over a betraying safety product even though the non-betraying
safety product was associated with a greater overall chance of death. Thus, it appears my
manipulation triggers the same heuristic type reaction as Koehler and Gershoff’s (2003)
manipulation that leads to a less rational choice.
Results for Study 1
Study 1 tested hypotheses 1-3 using a between participant experimental causal chain
design that used two experimental collections to test each link of the causal chain. Collection 1
tested the relationship between relying on bias-causing heuristics and considering information
related to an opportunity (Hypothesis 1) as well as the indirect relationship between relying on
bias-causing heuristics and forming an opportunity recognition belief through the consideration
of information (Hypothesis 3). Collection 2 then experimentally tested the relationship between
considering information related to an opportunity and the formation of an opportunity
recognition belief (Hypothesis 2). Taken together, these studies allow me to infer directionality
of the indirect effect that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has on forming an opportunity
recognition belief through the amount of information considered (Hypothesis 3).
Results for Study 1 Collection 1
Collection 1 of Study 1 provides data to test hypotheses 1 and 3; thus, I will present the
results of hypothesis 3 before the results of hypothesis 2, which is tested using data from
38

Collection 2 of Study 1. Table 1 presents the correlations between the variables in Collection 1
of Study 1 and Figure 2 graphically provides the distribution of the mediating variable (amount
of information considered) and the dependent variable (opportunity recognition belief) that were
used in this collection. Following procedures recommended by Cohen et al. (2003), I tested
Hypothesis 1 using a Poisson regression (Hornsby, Kuratko, Shepherd, & Bott, 2009).iii
Hypothesis 1 predicted that relying on cognitive heuristics reduces the amount of information
considered related to an opportunity. Table 2 presents the results for this analysis. These results
revealed a negative relationship between the reliance on a cognitive heuristic (the betrayal
condition) and the amount of information considered (B = -.321, p < .05). The incident rate ratio
for the heuristic condition was .73, suggesting that participants who were exposed to the betrayal
heuristic considered about 73% of the information that participants who did not rely on the
betrayal heuristic considered. In regard to the data from Collection 1 of Study 1, this incident rate
ration was associated with participants in the betrayal condition considering on average 2.82
pieces of information, whereas participants in the no betrayal condition considered on average
3.89 pieces of information. Further, I conducted a Tobit analysis as a robustness check to ensure
that the results of the Poisson regression were not biased due to the censorship of my dependent
variable. Table 2 presents the results for this analysis and shows there is no difference in the
pattern of the results. Specifically, both the Poisson and Tobit models show participants in the
betrayal condition to consider significantly less information than participants in the non-betrayal
condition. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported.
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I also tested Hypothesis 3 using the data from Collection 1 of Study 1. Specifically I
tested this hypothesis using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Given that my
mediator is a count variable, the ordinary least squares regression assumption that the estimation
errors are homoscedastic is violated. A bootstrapping procedure, however, is appropriate for this
analysis because it does not require standard errors and such this assumption does not apply to
inferences about the indirect effect when using bootstrap confidence intervals (Hayes, 2012).
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the amount of information considered mediates the relationship
between the reliance on bias-causing heuristics and forming an opportunity recognition belief.
Table 3 presents the results for this analysis. These results revealed a negative indirect
relationship between the reliance on a cognitive heuristic (the betrayal condition) and forming an
opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of information (B = -.33). Specifically,
my analyses demonstrated that the amount of information considered mediates the relationship
between the reliance on a cognitive heuristic and the formation of an opportunity recognition
belief, as the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval ([-.49, -.0005]) does not include zero.iv Thus,
Hypothesis 3 is also supported, although the directionality of the results is difficult to determine
because the mediator and the dependent variable were both measured variables.
Results for Study 1 Collection 2
Using regression techniques I tested Hypothesis 2 with the data from Collection 2 of
Study 1. Table 1 presents the correlations between the variables for this collection and Figure 3
graphically provides the distribution of the dependent variable (opportunity recognition belief)
that was used in this collection. Hypothesis 2 predicted that considering information related to an
40

opportunity is positively related to forming an opportunity recognition belief. Table 4 presents
the results for this analysis. These results revealed a positive relationship between the amount of
information considered and the formation of an opportunity recognition belief (B = .21, p < .01).
It is also notable that participants in the low information condition had an average opportunity
recognition belief of 3.49, whereas participants in the high information condition had an average
opportunity recognition belief of 3.92. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Discussion of Study 1
Taken together, collection 1 and collection 2 provide evidence that: (a) relying on a biascausing heuristic leads to considering less information about an opportunity (Hypothesis 1); (b)
considering less information about an opportunity reduces the likelihood of forming the belief
that one has recognized an opportunity (Hypotheses 2); and (c) that the amount of information
considered about an opportunity mediates the negative relationship between relying on a biascausing heuristic and forming the belief that one has recognized an opportunity (Hypotheses 3).
Thus, although heuristic-based thinking is generally thought to be beneficial for entrepreneurs, it
appears that the reliance on some heuristics can lead individuals to miss an opportunity because
they do not consider information about the opportunity. In Study 2, I seek to determine if
differences in cognitive processing styles allow some individuals to overcome the negative effect
that the reliance bias-causing heuristics have on opportunity recognized through the
considerations of less information. Specifically, I consider two individual differences
(Entrepreneurial Alertness and the Need for Cognition) that are related to being more reflective
in one’s cognitive processing style as first stage moderators to this process. I suggest that
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individuals high in either of these differences are more likely to shift from their heuristic-based
processing style to a slower, more analytical processing style and in doing so consider more
information about the opportunity and thus be more likely to form the belief that they have
recognized the opportunity. In Study 2, I also extend the generalizability of my findings from
Study 1 by using a sample of entrepreneurs.
Study 2
Study 2 used a between-participant experimental design. I built on Study 1 by using a
more generalizable sample (actual entrepreneurs) to reanalyze the indirect relationship between
the reliance on a cognitive heuristic and the formation of an opportunity recognition belief
through the consideration of information (Hypothesis 3). Further, I considered two individual
differences as potential moderators of this indirect effect. As theorized above, I propose two first
stage moderators, the need for cognition (Hypothesis 4) and entrepreneurial alertness
(Hypothesis 5).
Sample for Study 2
Entrepreneurs who had founded a business completed an online survey that was provided
to them via email in return for a five-dollar Amazon gift card code that was provided to them via
email. All respondents and contacts through which data was obtained were assured anonymity
and confidentiality, thus their names do not appear in this document. Entrepreneurs’ email
addresses were obtained through the following outlets. The primary researcher visited businesses
located in the central business districts of Wyomissing, PA, Philadelphia, PA, Orlando, FL and
Tampa, FL during business hours and asked to speak to the founding owner/s of each business. If
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owners were available, the primary researcher asked if they would be willing to take a survey
that would be emailed to them that evening in return for a five-dollar Amazon gift card code. If
they were willing to partake in the survey, the survey was emailed to them within 24 hours. This
group of potential participants was also asked to share the link with any other founding owners
from their business or whom they knew.
Email addresses were also obtained through multiple Chambers of Commerce.
Specifically, the primary researcher personally visited, called and /or emailed Chambers of
Commerce in and around the Philadelphia, PA and Orlando, FL areas. Locations, phone numbers
and email addresses for each chamber were found through Internet searches. The primary
researcher then asked a representative from each chamber if they would be willing to share the
Chambers’ email list or send the survey request to members who owned and founded a business.
Chambers could not provide their email list but some were willing to send their members the
survey link and information.
The primary researcher also contacted and visited incubators and entrepreneurship groups
in Reading, PA, Orlando, FL and Tampa, FL. Locations and contact information for each
incubator and entrepreneurship group were obtained through Internet searches. The primary
researcher then asked representatives from each incubator for an email list of their clients (i.e.
businesses) and representatives from entrepreneurship groups for the email addresses of their
members. No incubator or entrepreneurship group was willing to provide their email lists but
some were willing to send the survey link to their members. Because all entrepreneurs who were
personally visited or contacted through an incubator, chamber or entrepreneurship group
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responded to the same survey link, specific details of each group cannot be determined.
However, over 100 individual businesses, two incubators, four Chambers of commerce and four
entrepreneurship groups were contacted which resulted in 64 responses from entrepreneurs.
These entrepreneurs founded businesses in a wide range of industries including but not limited to
finance, technology, retail, and manufacturing. Lastly, entrepreneurs’ email addresses were also
obtained by inviting undergraduate entrepreneurship students at a large public university to
recruit founding entrepreneurs to partake in the survey. Students received extra credit in return
for recruiting entrepreneurs.
All of these efforts resulted in a final sample of 129 participants who completed the
survey. I removed 13 (10%) cases where respondents did not understand the manipulation
(specifically cases were removed where participants did not correctly indicate whether the
product that they read about caused death) and 10 (9%) additional cases where the respondents
did not qualify as entrepreneurs because they had never founded a business, leaving a sample of
106 entrepreneurs. Of the 106 entrepreneurs, 64% were male; on average, they were 43 years
old, 91% had at least some college courses, and they were 83% Caucasian/White. The
entrepreneurs had founded businesses in a wide range of industries including but not limited to
finance, technology, retail, and manufacturing.
Procedure for Study 2
This study used an experimental design similar to the first collection of Study 1 but also
considered the moderating variables. This study also used the application of a real technology,
from a tech-transfer office, to a market that it was actually applied to. Specifically, participants
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were given the same stimulus and manipulation noted in collection 1 of Study 1 and then given
the opportunity to collect as little or as much information as they wanted about the opportunity.
They were then asked to complete an opportunity recognition belief scale regarding the
technology being applied to the personal safety market. Additionally, however, participants were
also asked to complete measures of my moderating variables, entrepreneurial alertness, and the
need for cognition.
Measures for Study 2
The amount of information considered and opportunity recognition belief were collected
in the same manner as described above. For Study 2 the reliability for the opportunity
recognition belief scale was .85
Entrepreneurial alertness
I gauged entrepreneurial alertness with a 13-item measure developed by Tang, Kacmar,
and Busenitz (2012). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with certain
statements about themselves on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).
Sample items include ‘‘I am always actively looking for new information” and ‘‘I have a gut
feeling for potential opportunities.” The reliability for this measure was .88.
Need for cognition
I assessed participants’ need for cognition with the 18-item measure developed by
Cacioppo et al. (1984). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which certain statements
were characteristic of them on a 5-point scale (1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 5 = extremely
characteristic). Sample items include ‘‘I would rather do something that requires little thought
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than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities” reversed scored and ‘‘I really
enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.” The reliability for this
measure was .85.
Results for Study 2
Study 2 tested hypotheses 3-5 using a between participants experimental design and a
more generalizable group of participants (actual entrepreneurs). Before testing my hypotheses of
interest I followed Koehler and Gershoff’s (2003) example and confirmed the effectiveness of
my betrayal manipulation for the data from Study 2. Specifically, I asked participants on a 1
(definitely no) to 5 (definitely yes) scale if the personal rescue hood betrays the people it is
supposed to protect. I then conducted an analysis of variance on these ratings. The results
indicated a significant main effect for my manipulation, F(1, 105) 5.29, p < .05. Specifically, the
betrayal description received a significantly higher rating (M = 2.21) than the non-betrayal
condition (M = 1.71). Thus, my betrayal manipulation also appeared successful for Study 2.
Table 1 presents the correlations between the variables in Study 2 and Figure 4
graphically provides the distribution of the mediating (amount of information considered) and
the dependent variable (opportunity recognition belief) that were used in this collection. I tested
hypotheses 3-5 using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Hypothesis 3 predicted the
amount of information considered mediates the relationship between the reliance on bias-causing
heuristics and forming an opportunity recognition belief. Table 6 presents the results for this
analysis. These results do not indicate a significant indirect effect, as the 95% bootstrapped
confidence interval ([-.0841, .1042]) includes zero. Thus, the results for Study 2 do not support
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Hypothesis 3. Hypotheses 4 and 5 predicted that the need for cognition and entrepreneurial
alertness respectively moderate the indirect effect that the reliance on bias-causing heuristics has
on opportunity recognition belief via the amount of information considered. Specifically, I
proposed that this indirect effect is weaker for entrepreneurs with high levels of each of these
individual differences. Table 6 presents the results for these analyses. These results show that the
indirect effect, through the amount of information considered, is not significant at any level of
the need for cognition or entrepreneurial alertness. Thus neither, Hypothesis 4 nor Hypothesis 5
was supported.
Discussion of Study 2
Surprisingly, the results from Study 2 were inconsistent with the results from Study 1 in
regard to hypothesis 3. Specifically, for entrepreneurs, I did not find that the amount of
information considered about an opportunity mediates the negative relationship between relying
on a bias-causing heuristic and the formation of an opportunity recognition belief. A closer
inspection of the individual path relationships shows that Path A, the relationship between
relying on a bias-causing heuristic to considering less information about an opportunity, was not
supported (B = .05, p = ns) but that Path B, the relationship between considering information
about an opportunity and an increased likelihood of forming the belief that one has recognized an
opportunity, was supported (B = .12, p < .05). Further, the results for Study 2 did not find this
non-significant indirect effect to be conditional on either the need for cognition or
entrepreneurial alertness. Thus, the results suggest that entrepreneurs are not affected by the
reliance on a bias-causing heuristics in regard to how much information they consider about an
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opportunity and that, for entrepreneurs, the amount of information considered about an
opportunity does not mediate the relationship between the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic
and the formation of an opportunity recognition belief.
Post Hoc Analysis
Given the inconsistent results between Study 1 and Study 2 regarding Hypothesis 3 (the
indirect effect through the amount of information considered), it seemed possible that the
inconsistent findings were related to the types of participants in each sample. Specifically, I
found a negative indirect effect from the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic to the formation of
an opportunity recognition belief through the amount of information considered using a sample
of working adults (26% of whom were entrepreneurs in Study 1) and a marginally significant
indirect effect using a sample of students and adults (using an piloted version of the manipulation
provided in Appendix N). This indirect effect, however, was not found in Study 2 when
considered with a sample exclusively made up of entrepreneurs. As I theorize above, I generally
suggest that reflective people (e.g. alert and high in the need for cognition) will be less likely to
reduce the amount of information that they consider when faced with a bias-causing heuristic and
thus be less affected by bias-causing heuristics during the opportunity recognition process. It
seems plausible that entrepreneurs people that have previously gone through the opportunity
recognition process and recognized an opportunity may be representative of these reflective
people. Thus, the sample from Study 2, that was exclusively made up of entrepreneurs may have
limited my ability to tease out conditional indirect effects based on being reflective.
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To address that line of argument, I combined the data from collection 1 of Study 1 with
the data from Study 2 and conducted an analysis of variance to determine whether entrepreneurs
were significantly different in regard to variables that are associated with being reflective.
Further, I analyzed the conditional indirect effect that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has
on opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of information based on whether the
participant was an entrepreneur (had founded a business). The sample for the post hoc analyses
consisted of the 106 entrepreneurs from Study 2, the ten respondents from Study 2 who did not
qualify as entrepreneurs because they had not founded a business (see page 42) and the 55
respondents used in Study 1. This led to a sample of 171 participants, 120 of who had founded of
business. Fifty-three percent of the participants were male; on average, participants were 41.1
years old; 86% had at least some college courses; and 75% were Caucasian/White. The
entrepreneurs in the sample had founded business in a wide range of industries including but not
limited to finance, technology, retail, and manufacturing.
In terms of my analysis of variance, I tested to see if entrepreneurs were significantly
higher in entrepreneurial alertness, their need for cognition, and their score on the cognitive
reflections test. The cognitive reflections test is a three-question test designed by Frederick
(2005) that measures how reflective someone is when making a decision. Specifically, it tests
how likely someone is to override their initial inaccurate heuristic based response for further
consideration that leads to the correct answer. In following Toplak, West, and Stanovich’s (2011)
example, I created a composite of performance on the three items, which are provided in
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Appendix Q. The mean performance for the test was 0.4 items correct (SD =.39). The reliability
for this measure was .79.
Table 7 presents the correlations between the variables for my post hoc analyses. Table 8
presents the results for the analysis of variance. It is notable that sample sizes of the groups for
this analysis are significantly different. To that, I conducted homogeneity of variance tests and
did not find any of the variance to be significantly different. Results indicate that entrepreneurs
score significantly higher in all three of these variables associated with being reflective.
Specifically, my analysis indicated a significant main effect for being an entrepreneur on
entrepreneurial alertness F(1, 170) 7.68, p < .01, the need for cognition F(1, 170) 5.62, p < .05,
and scores on the cognitive reflections test F(1, 163) 10.13, p < .01. Regarding alertness,
entrepreneurs rated themselves as higher on the alertness scale (M = 4.03) than nonentrepreneurs (M = 3.77). Regarding the need for cognition, entrepreneurs rated themselves as
higher on the need for cognition scale (M = 3.66) than non-entrepreneurs (M = 3.41). Lastly,
regarding scores on the cognitive reflections test, entrepreneurs scored higher on the cognitive
reflections test (M = 0.44) than non-entrepreneurs (M = 0.24). Thus, it appears that from a
cognitive perspective, entrepreneurs may be more reflective than non-entrepreneurs.
I analyzed the conditional indirect effect that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has
on opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of information based on whether on
not the participant was an entrepreneur (had founded a business) using the PROCESS macro for
SPSS (Hayes, 2013). Consistent with my mixed findings in Study 1 and Study 2, based on a 90%
confidence interval, bootstrapping results revealed that the indirect effect from the reliance on a
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bias-causing heuristic to opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of information
was negative and significant for non-entrepreneurs (B =-.14, [-.2901,-.0070]) but not significant
for entrepreneurs (B =-.01 [-.0971,.0842]).
Taken together, the results of Study 1, Study 2 and the above post hoc analysis suggest
that entrepreneurs may react differently to bias-causing heuristics during the opportunity
recognition process than non-entrepreneurs because they are more reflective. To examine that, I
further tested my general proposition that being reflective weakens the negative indirect effect
that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic has on opportunity recognition belief through the
consideration of information using the combined samples. Specifically, I analyzed this
conditional indirect effect based on variables associated with being reflective (entrepreneurial
alertness, the need for cognition and scores on the cognitive reflections test) using the PROCESS
macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013).
Table 9 presents the results for these analyses. These results showed that this indirect
effect is not conditional based on either of my hypothesized individual difference moderators
(entrepreneurial alertness or the need for cognition). This indirect effect, however, was found to
be conditional based on a 90% confidence interval regarding how reflective an individual is
(assessed by the cognitive reflections test). Specifically, based on a 90% confidence interval, the
indirect effect is negative and significant (B =.01, [ -.2339,-.0038]) for individuals who scored
low on the cognitive reflections test and not significant (B =.03, [-.0789,.1438]) for individuals
who scored high on the cognitive reflections test.
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Discussion
I found mixed support for the notion that bias-causing heuristics, in this case the betrayal
heuristic, causes individuals to consider less information (Hypothesis 1). Specifically, this
appears to be true for less-reflective individuals and non-entrepreneurs. I found consistent
support for the notion that the consideration of information leads to forming the belief that one
has recognized an opportunity (Hypothesis 2). Further, I found inconsistent results regarding the
indirect relationship between the reliance on a bias-causing heuristics and forming the belief that
one has recognized an opportunity through the consideration of information (Hypothesis 3:
supported in Study 1, marginally supported in the pretest, but not in Study 2). These inconsistent
findings appear to be a result of the samples chosen for each study (Study 1 = Adults, Study 2 =
Entrepreneurs) and because this indirect effect is conditional on how reflective individuals are
(based on the cognitive reflection test). I also proposed that the need for cognition (Hypothesis 4)
and entrepreneurial alertness (Hypothesis 5) would capture how reflective individuals are and
moderate this indirect effect, however, these hypotheses were not supported. Taken together,
these results provide some support for the general notion that bias-causing heuristics may
prevent less reflective individuals from recognizing an opportunity because they consider less
information about the opportunity. More highly reflective individuals, however, are not as
affected by these heuristics.
Theoretical Implications
Prior literature suggests heuristics may be advantageous in regard to opportunity
recognition (Baron, 2004; Baron & Ensley, 2006; Baron & Ward, 2004). In contrast, I show that
52

bias-causing heuristics can be detrimental to forming the belief that one has recognized an
opportunity (at least in the case of betrayal aversion as the source of bias). My results suggest
that these heuristics negatively affect the ability to recognize an opportunity through their
influence on the amount of information that one considers. These results provide empirical
support for McMullen and Shepherd’s (2006) model of entrepreneurial action that suggests
considering additional information reduces uncertainty, which enables individuals to form the
belief that they have recognized an opportunity (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al.,
2007).
As would be expected based on dual process theories of cognition, the negative effect that
heuristics have on the ability to recognize an opportunity through the consideration of
information is conditional on how reflective an individual is. From a default-interventionist
perspective, reflective individuals are better able to shift from their faster processing system to a
more analytical cognitive process. I theorized that this ability to shift would allow reflective
individuals to slow down, consider additional information about an opportunity, and thus be less
negatively affected by bias-causing heuristics in regard to forming the belief that they
recognition an opportunity. My results marginally support this relationship and suggest that
being reflective may be important in the opportunity recognition process. My results also show
that entrepreneurs tend to be more reflective.
It is interesting to note that although being reflective (as measured by the cognitive
reflections test) is positively correlated with both the need for cognition and entrepreneurial
alertness (see Table 7), neither of these individual differences moderated the indirect effect from
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a bias-causing heuristic to opportunity recognition belief through the consideration of
information. Although these individual differences are associated with being reflective, it does
not appear as though alert or high need for cognition individuals are reflective enough to
overcome bias-causing heurists (Cacioppo et al., 1996; Gaglio & Katz, 2001; Stanovich, 2009a).
Another interesting finding was that being an entrepreneur (founding a business) negated
the negative indirect effect from a bias-causing heuristic to opportunity recognition belief
through the consideration of information. This finding is likely because entrepreneurs are
significantly more reflective than non-entrepreneurs. From an investigation of the means,
however, it is worth noting that, on average, entrepreneurs considered less information and were
less likely to form the belief that they recognized an opportunity than non-entrepreneurs in the
non-heuristic condition. In the heuristic condition, however, entrepreneurs did not reduce the
amount of information they considered and only reduced their level of opportunity recognition
slightly. On the other hand, non-entrepreneurs reduced each by a larger margin such that
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs considered about the same amount of information and were
equally likely to form the belief that they had recognized an opportunity when relying on a biascausing heuristic. A graphical representation is displayed in Figure 5.
This surprising finding may be in line with the idea that entrepreneurs focus on breadth
(the number of opportunities they consider) and not depth (how much information they consider
about each opportunity) when considering opportunities but are not as easily fooled by biascausing heuristics. That is, entrepreneurs (those who have been through the founding process)
may realize the importance of not spending much time one any one opportunity so they have the
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ability to examine many opportunities. It is also possible that entrepreneurs rely on personal
knowledge and experience more so than external stimuli as compared to non-entrepreneurs.
Thus, entrepreneurs may make up for not considering information by using information that they
possess. If this is the case, it would be unknown whether bias-causing heuristics cause
entrepreneurs to spend less time considering information that they already have. An alternative
explanation may be that the experience of going through the founding process and realizing that
many opportunities are not worth pursuing may make entrepreneurs harder to impress. Thus,
entrepreneurs may be more hesitant to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity
or to spend time considering one.
Overall, this study makes multiple contributions to the entrepreneurship literature. First, I
show the potential negative effects of heuristics (specifically, the betrayal heuristic) on
opportunity recognition and a process through which this relationship may work, the
consideration of information. Second, I empirically show that considering additional information
positively affects forming an opportunity recognition belief as proposed by McMullen and
Shepherd’s (2006) conceptual model of entrepreneurial action. Third, I integrate dual process
theories of cognition into the entrepreneurship literature and show that being reflective may be
essential in the opportunity recognition process. Fourth, I empirically provide preliminary
evidence that suggests entrepreneurs are more reflective in their cognitive processing style, more
alert and have a higher need for cognition than non-entrepreneurs. Lastly, I empirically show that
bias-causing heuristics do not affect entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs in the same way.
Specifically, I show that the reliance on a bias-causing heuristic does not cause entrepreneurs but
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does cause non-entrepreneurs to consider less information about an opportunity and as a result be
less likely to form the belief that they have recognized that opportunity.
Practical Implications
This study also provides useful findings for entrepreneurs regarding the importance of
information when considering the existence of an opportunity. That is, my results show that
entrepreneurs tend to consider less information about a potential opportunity and that considering
information about a potential opportunity is positively related to forming the belief that an actual
opportunity does or does not exist. This belief is a prerequisite to determining if that opportunity
is for the entrepreneur himself or herself. Although considering less information about a potential
opportunity may be beneficial in some circumstances because it allows for more time to consider
additional opportunities, it can also lead to the missing out on a great opportunity. Thus, current
entrepreneurs should be aware that their tendency to consider less information about a potential
opportunity could have serious implications such as missing out on the next great opportunity.
This study also provides useful findings for potential entrepreneurs and entrepreneur educators.
Specifically, although would-be entrepreneurs are often told to follow their gut regarding
recognizing opportunities, their immediate reactions may not always be the best ones. Certainly,
quick decisions may benefit entrepreneurs, particularly seasoned entrepreneurs, by allowing
them to consider many opportunities. My results, however, suggest that seasoned
entrepreneurs—perhaps because they are more reflective in their cognitive processing style—are
less negatively affected than would-be entrepreneurs by bias-causing heuristics. Thus, would-be
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entrepreneurs should be especially careful not to over-rely on their gut but to realize the
importance of honing their ability to be reflective when searching for opportunities.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research Directions
My study has multiple strengths. Specifically, the experimental causal chain design that I
used for Study 1 allows me to isolate my variables of interest and make strong inferences about
the causal path of the hypothesized relationship. Further, using the application of a real
technology being applied to the market that it was actually applied to helps with the
generalizability of my theorizing. Further, using a sample of actual entrepreneurs also
strengthens the generalizability of my findings and allows me to consider important differences
between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs.
My study, however, is not without limitations. To begin with, my sample for Study 1 was
small; however, I did find the hypothesized relationships to be significant, and these results were
replicated in the pretest with a sample of 201 participants. Further, my studies only provide a
small glimpse into this very complicated opportunity recognition process. Specifically,
throughout all of my analyses, I only used one bias-causing heuristics manipulation (i.e., the
betrayal heuristic). Although I tactically chose this manipulation after multiple pretests, the use
of one heuristic limits the generalizability of my findings, as other bias-causing heuristics may
have a different effect on the consideration of information and the formation of an opportunity
recognition belief. Beyond this, by only examining bias-causing heuristics, I limit myself to only
considering one side of the coin. That is, I do not investigate the possible benefits of accurate
heuristics on the consideration of information and the formation of an opportunity recognition
57

belief. Further, I only allowed individuals to collect up to five pieces of information, which may
limit my ability to fully understand these relationships. That is, the nature of the relationship
between information and opportunity recognition may change, as more information is available.
Additionally, I only presented individuals with one technology/market combination that had
previously been exploited and, as such, should have been rated high in regard to opportunity
recognition belief. The relationship between bias-causing heuristics and both the consideration of
information and opportunity recognition belief, however, may be different for non-exploited,
poorly matched opportunities. Further, although the experimental design of Study 1 strengthens
this research, it also limits the generalizability of my findings, which was exemplified by the
inconsistent results in Study 2.
The unexpected findings and above noted limitations, however, provide interesting
avenues for future research. Specifically, I suggest the effect of bias-causing heuristics should be
explored in a sample of both would-be and current entrepreneurs. Further, the effect of
alternative bias-causing heuristics should also be explored. Beyond that, the interesting finding
that entrepreneurs may consider less information generally, and more importantly may be less
likely to form the belief that they have recognized an opportunity, should be explored.
Specifically, I suggest considering how entrepreneurs, as compared to non-entrepreneurs, trade
off between breadth (the number of opportunities explored) and depth (how much information is
explored about each opportunity) when considering opportunities.
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Conclusion
This study sheds light on the potential negatives of fast thinking and the benefits of
considering information to would-be entrepreneurs. Seasoned entrepreneurs may trade off the
depth of their search for greater breadth in their search, with little or no consequences. Seeing
seasoned entrepreneurs’ successes may cause would be entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship
educators alike to advocate this type of fast thinking shallow search. Seasoned entrepreneurs,
however, appear to use different cognitive processes that allow them to be successful when using
this approach. Thus, would-be entrepreneurs should be cautious when relying on fast thinking
during the opportunity recognition process.
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APPENDIX A:
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, RELIABILITIES AND
CORRELATIONS FOR STUDY 1 AND STUDY 2
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Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities and Correlations for Study 1 and Study 2
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APPENDIX B:
POISSON REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COLLECTION 1 OF STUDY 1
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Table 2 Poisson Regression Results for Collection 1 of Study 1
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APPENDIX C:
BOOTSTRAPPING ANALYSES RESULTS FOR COLLECTION 1 OF
STUDY 1
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Table 3 Bootstrapping Analyses Result for Collection 1 of Study 1
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APPENDIX D:
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COLLECTION 2 OF STUDY 1
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Table 4 Regression Results for Collection 2 of Study 1
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APPENDIX E:
ALTERNATIVE REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR
COLLECTION 1 OF STUDY 1
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Table 5 Alternative Regression Analysis Results for Collection 1 of Study 1

69

APPENDIX F:
BOOTSTRAPPING ANALYSES RESULTS FOR STUDY 2
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Table 6 Bootstrapping Analyses Result for Study 2
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APPENDIX G:
MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, RELIABILITIES AND
CORRELATIONS FOR THE POST HOC SAMPLE
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Table 7 Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities and Correlations for the Post Hoc Sample
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APPENDIX H:
POST HOC ANOVA RESULTS FOR BEING AN ENTREPRENEUR ON
REFLECTIVE OUTCOMES
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Table 8 Post Hoc ANOVA Results for Being an Entrepreneur on Reflective Outcomes
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APPENDIX I:
BOOTSTRAPPING ANALYSES RESULTS FOR THE POST HOC
ANALYSIS
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Table 9 Bootstrapping Analyses Result for the Post Hoc Analysis
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APPENDIX J:
FIGURE 1: CONCEPTUAL MODEL
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APPENDIX K:
FIGURE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF MODERATING AND DEPENDENT
VARIABLE FOR COLLECTION 1 OF STUDY 1
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Figure 2 Distribution of Moderating and Dependent Variable for Collection 1 of Study 1
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APPENDIX L:
FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE FOR
COLLECTION 2 OF STUDY 1
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Figure 3 Distribution of Dependent Variable for Collection 2 of Study 1
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APPENDIX M:
FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF MODERATING AND DEPENDENT
VARIABLE FOR STUDY 2
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Figure 4 Distribution of Moderating and Dependent Variable for Study 2
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APPENDIX N:
FIGURE 5: MEAN COMPARISON OF FOUNDER AND NON-FOUNDER
ON RECOGNITION/INFORMATION COLLECTED
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Type of Heuristic

Definition

Availability
Heuristic

When one estimate of probabilities or
frequencies is based on the ease to which
something comes to mind (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973).

Example(s)









Representativeness When one estimates probabilities about
Heuristic
something because it is very similar to a
prototype of that category (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1974).
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People overestimate the possibility of deaths due to
dramatic events such as tornadoes (Sutherland, 2007).
Managers’ reactions to HR procedures are based on
the availability of their experiences with the HR
system (Taylor, Masterson, Renard, & Tracy 1998).
Managers base performance appraisals on more vivid
or recent acts (Bazerman & Moore, 2012).
Managers base perceptions of environmental
uncertainty on the availability heuristic (Ireland, Hitt,
Bettis, Porras, & Auld, 1987).
Participants estimate the frequency of seven- letter
words with the sixth letter “n” to be lower than the
frequency of seven-letter words ending in “ing”
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
Patients ignore base rates and believe that a positive
result for a test that is 99% accurate at diagnosing a
disease that only occurs in 1 out of 10,000 people in
the population means that there is a 99% chance that
they have they disease when there is really only a 1%
chance that they have the disease (Axelsson, 2000).
Entrepreneurs ignoring base rates of business failure
in difficult markets (Moore, Oesch, & Zietsma, 2007).
Individuals are insensitive to the sample size when
determining how likely it would be for the percentage
of male births on any given day to differ from the
mean percentage of male births in a small hospital





Confirmation
Heuristic



The tendency to seek and interpret
information that supports an individual’s
belief or expectation (Nickerson, 1998).
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where there are few births each day compared to a
large hospital where there are many (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974).
Individuals expect sequences of random events to
appear random and as such judge the likelihood of a
sequence of events such as coin flips that appear to be
less likely (e.g., people judge coin flip pattern 1
(HTHTHT) as less likely than pattern 2 (HTHHHTT)
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972).
Based on the conjunction fallacy, individuals assume
that the probability of multiple conditions is more
likely than the probability of one of those conditions
(see my discussion of the Linda problem) (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1983).
(Confirmation Trap) Individuals with conservative
political views tend to seek out conservative pundits,
such as Sean Hannity, and individuals with liberal
political views tend to seek out liberal pundits such as
Bill Maher (Bazerman & Moore, 2012).
(Confirmation Trap) When given information about the
effectiveness/ineffectiveness of the death penalty
deterring crime, those who supported the death
penalty found information suggesting that it was
effective to be credible and found reasons to disregard
the information suggesting it was ineffective. Whereas
the opposite happened for people that did not
support the use of a death penalty (Lord, Ross, &
Lepper, 1979).
(Anchoring) Randomly generated numbers affecting





Affect Heuristic



Relying on one’s affective state when
making a judgment (Finucane, Alhakami,
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000).



Outrage Heuristic

When determining punishment, people
consider the outrageousness of a crime
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).



Betrayal Heuristic

In making judgments one punishes and
does not reward betrayals of trust
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individuals’ estimates of the number of African
countries belonging to the UN (Kahneman & Tversky,
1974).
(Anchoring) Positive first impressions by an
interviewer leading to an interview behavior more
likely to confirm that belief (e.g. selling of the
company during the interview, collecting less
information from the applicant) (Dougherty, Turban, &
Callender, 1994).
(Hindsight) Believing that one would correctly assess
the outcome of a battle that they were (truthfully or
falsely) told an outcome of, if they had not known the
outcome. Results showed that no matter what
outcome (the true or false outcome) people were told,
they believed that was the outcome they would have
picked had they not been told any information
(Fischhoff, 1975).
A CIO of a large financial firm investing tens of millions
of dollars in a company because he liked the firm
(Kahneman, 2011).
Attractive entrepreneurs and their ideas being rated
more favorably due to an increase in affect of the
evaluator (Baron, Markman, & Bollinger, 2006).
People punish legally identical crimes differently (e.g.,
the robbery of a child being punished more than the
robbery of an adult) (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008).
Choosing not to purchase the overall safer of two cars
because the safer car is equipped with an air bag (i.e.,

(Sunstein, 2005).


Effort Heuristic

Scarcity Heuristic

Simulation
Heuristic

When quality judgments are based on the
evaluators’ perception of the amount of
effort that was put into creating the thing
being evaluated (Kruger, Wirtz,Van Boven,
& Altermatt, 2004).
When things are valued based on how
easily they are to obtain (or lost) (Cialdini,
1988).



When the ease to which one can create a
mental construction of an imagined reality
determines how likely they believe it is to
happen (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).








92

a safety device) that betrays the people it is supposed
to protect and causes death (Koehler & Gershoff,
2003).
Choosing to punish identical crimes differently when
they betray a trust (e.g., a bank robbery by a bank
security guard being punished more than a bank
robbery by a taxi cab driver) (Koehler & Gershoff
2003).
Rating the same painting as being of higher quality
because it took more time to create (Kruger et al.,
2004).

People finding a new appreciation for life after a near
death experience (King, Hicks, & Abdelkhalik, 2009).
Job candidates believing that jobs with fewer openings
paid a higher wage than jobs with more openings
(Highhouse, Beadle, Gallo, & Miller, 1998).
The more easily patients could picture a negative
event, the more likely they believed that event was
going to happen to them (Raune, MacLeod, & Holmes,
2005).
The ease to which one could imagine a weather
disaster related to how likely they believe it is that
disaster would occur (Greening, Dollinger, & Pitz,
1996).

APPENDIX P: HEURISTICS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP
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Cite
Baron, R. A. (1998)

Theoretical/
Empirical
Theoretical

Heuristic/s

Relevant findings/propositions

Affect heuristic
Self-serving bias
Planning fallacy







Baron, R. A. (2004)

Theoretical

Styles of cognitive processing






Baron, R. A. (2006)

Theoretical

Prototype heuristic
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Entrepreneurs may be more susceptible to
the affect heuristic which can lead to
serious errors in judgment.
Entrepreneurs may be more susceptible to
the self-serving bias that can lead to
overconfidence and interpersonal friction.
Successful entrepreneurs, however, may
be less susceptible to the self-serving bias
than less successful entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs may be more susceptible to
the planning fallacy that can lead to
unrealistic timetables.
Entrepreneurs may be prone to using
heuristic type processing.
Successful entrepreneurs may be
particularly able to switch from their
heuristic based processing system to their
slower cognitive process and such have
particularly effective heuristics.
Successful entrepreneurs may be less
susceptible to biases that lead to poor
decisions than less successful
entrepreneurs.
Prototypes may allow entrepreneurs to

Baron, R. A., & Ensley, M. D.
(2006)

Empirical

Prototype heuristic



Baron, R. A., & Ward, T. B.
(2004)

Theoretical

Styles of cognitive processing




Burmeister, K., & Schade, C.
(2007).

Empirical

Status quo heuristic



Busenitz, L. W. (1999)

Empirical

Representativeness
Overconfidence
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see patterns in what seem to be unrelated
things and such may be beneficial in
regard to recognizing opportunities.
Experienced entrepreneurs have more
clearly defined mental prototypes of
opportunities than less experienced
entrepreneurs. Further, experienced
entrepreneurs’ mental prototypes are
richer in context and focus more on
realizing financial gain than less
experienced entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs are not immune from
cognitive biases.
Entrepreneurs’ preference for heuristic
based thinking and their ability to switch
back and forth between their fast and slow
cognitive processing system should be
explored.
Entrepreneurs were no more biased than
other groups. Specifically, entrepreneurs
were equally as biased by the status quo
heuristic as students but less affected by
the status quo heuristic than bankers.
Entrepreneurs were found to be more
likely to use the representativeness
heuristic and be more overconfident than
managers in large organizations.



Busenitz, L. W., & Barney, J. B. Empirical
(1997)

Representativeness
Overconfidence





Cooper, A. C., Woo, C. Y., &
Dunkelberg, W. C. (1988)

Empirical

Overconfidence



Forbes, D. P. (2005).

Empirical

Overconfidence






Shepherd, D. A., Haynie, J. M., Theoretical

Confirmatory search strategy
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These results suggest that entrepreneurs
deal with risky situations in a different way
than managers.
Entrepreneurs were found to be more
likely to use the representativeness
heuristic and be more overconfident than
managers in large organizations.
Individuals most susceptible to heuristics
may be the type of people who are most
likely to become entrepreneurs.
Both well-prepared and poorly prepared
entrepreneurs were found to be
overconfident when considering the
potential for success of their business.
Different types of entrepreneurs display
different degrees of overconfidence.
New venture founder-managers were
found to be more overconfident than new
venture non-founder managers.
Younger entrepreneurs were found to be
more overconfident than older
entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs in smaller and younger
ventures were found to be more
overconfident than entrepreneurs in larger
and older ventures.
Confirmatory search strategy may be a

& McMullen, J. S. (2012).
Simon, M., Houghton, S. M.,
& Aquino, K. (2000).

Empirical

Overconfidence
Illusion of control
Belief in small numbers



Ucbasaran, D., Westhead, P.,
& Wright, M. (2009).

Empirical

Heuristics and information
search



Zahra, S. A., Korri, J. S., & Yu,
J. (2005)

Theoretical

Heuristics and international
opportunity recognition
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useful heuristic for entrepreneurs when
considering opportunities.
MBA students who scored more highly in
the illusion of control or the belief in small
numbers perceived less risk regarding a
potential venture and such were more
willing to pursue it.
The use of heuristics may lead
entrepreneurs to consider less information
regarding opportunities which allows them
to consider more opportunities in a given
time period. This assertion was not
supported.
Past experience may enable entrepreneurs
to develop heuristics that allow them to
understand situations quickly. This may
explain why entrepreneurs consider some
venture ideas and ignore others in
international markets.
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Low Information Condition

High Information Condition

Researchers at a large university created low-temperature oxidation catalyst filters to convert carbon
monoxide to nontoxic carbon dioxide. The inventors of this technology did not want to personally
pursue business opportunities because they are purely scientists. This technology is now part of a
university’s technology transfer program that makes the technology available for a licensing deal with a
new or existing firm. One possible market that researchers suggested this technology could be applied
to is the fire safety and protection market through a personal rescue hood. The university technology
transfer office has done some research related to the application of the technology to this market. We
are asking you as a potential entrepreneur to evaluate this potential opportunity. On the next page we
provide you with the executive summary about the opportunity. Please carefully consider all of the
information provided.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
General Information:
There is a 5% chance General Information:
There is a 5% chance that
that homeowners in a serious fire will be killed
homeowners in a serious fire will be killed due to
due to smoke inhalation. Scientific tests
smoke inhalation. Scientific tests indicate, however,
indicate, however, that there is only a 1.5%
that there is only a 1.5% chance of death due to
chance of death due to smoke inhalation when a smoke inhalation when a personal rescue hood is
personal rescue hood is used. The rescue hood,
used. The rescue hood, however, could also cause
however, could also cause minor side effects
minor side effects such as a temporary rash.
such as a temporary rash.
Risk Analysis: State and Federal law is clear that
Risk Analysis: State and Federal law is clear
manufacturers, producers, distributors and retailers
that manufacturers, producers, distributors and
of fire safety equipment are not legally culpable for
retailers of fire safety equipment are not legally death or injures when the overall effect of the safety
culpable for death or injures when the overall
equipment results in a decrease in death from fire.
effect of the safety equipment results in a
That is, if a customer is injured or dies from using a
decrease in death from fire. That is, if a
fire safety hood they can not sue.
customer is injured or dies from using a fire
safety hood they can not sue.
Distribution: This type of product could be used
during emergencies at home, work, and school, as
well as for professional firefighting and rescue
efforts. The home fire safety market was responsible
for over 6 billion dollars in revenue last year
alone.
Market Validation: Preliminary market research
has shown that homeowners are overwhelmingly
interested in a product like this. Specifically, a poll
of 5,000 consumers showed 90 percent would be
interested in purchasing this type of product at $40
per hood.
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Manipulation used in Study 1 and Study 2
Earlier Manipulation Used in pretest
No Betrayal Condition
There is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire
will be killed due to smoke inhalation. Scientific tests
indicate, however, that there is only a 1.5% chance of
death due to smoke inhalation when a personal rescue
hood is used. The rescue hood, however, could also
cause minor side effects such as a temporary rash.

Smoke inhalation from noxious products of fire
combustion is the number one cause of death related
to home and work fires. A personal rescue hood,
incorporating a filtration system that utilizes a lowtemperature oxidation catalyst, would reduce smoke
inhalation death by 10%. The hood, however, could
also cause minor side effects such as a temporary
rash.

Betrayal Condition
There is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire
will be killed due to smoke inhalation. Scientific tests
indicate, however, that there is only a 1% chance of
death due to smoke inhalation when a personal rescue
hood is used. The rescue hood, however, may also kill
some homeowners. Specifically, some rescue hood users
may die due to hood suffocation caused by the hood
itself. Tests indicate that there is an additional one
chance in 200 (0.5%) that someone who is in a serious
fire, who uses the rescue hood, will be killed due to hood
suffocation.
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Smoke inhalation from noxious products of fire
combustion is the number one cause of death related
to home and work fires. A personal rescue hood,
incorporating a filtration system that utilizes a lowtemperature oxidation catalyst, would reduce smoke
inhalation death by 20%. The hood, however, would
also kill, due to suffocation from the hood itself, one
half (50%) of the people who would have otherwise
died from smoke inhalation.

APPENDIX S: RATIONALITY MANIPULATION
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Researchers at a large university created low-temperature oxidation catalyst filters to convert carbon monoxide to
nontoxic carbon dioxide. This technology is now part of a university’s technology transfer program that makes
the technology available for a licensing deal with a new or existing firm. One possible market that researchers
suggested this technology could be applied to is the fire safety and protection market through a personal
protection hood. The university technology transfer office has created two prototype personal protection hoods
(Hood A and Hood B). They are identical in regard to cost, price, production time and so on. Please consider the
below and which prototype Hood A or Hood B you would be more interested in licensing as a potential
entrepreneur.
Statistics indicate that there is a 5% chance that homeowners in a serious fire will be killed due to smoke
inhalation. Scientific tests indicate that there is only a 2% chance that homeowners that use Hood A in a serious
fire will be killed due to smoke inhalation from the fire. These tests also indicate that there is only a 1% chance
that homeowners that use Hood B in a serious fire will die due to smoke inhalation. However, Hood B may kill
homeowners who would not have died if they were using Hood A. Specifically, some Hood B users may die due
to hood suffocation caused by the hood itself. Tests indicate that there is an additional one chance in 200 (0.5%)
that someone who is in a serious fire who uses Hood B will be killed due to hood suffocation.
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1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost? ____Cents
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? ____Minutes
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake? ____days
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i

It in notable that authors such as Gerd Gigerenzer and Ralph Hertwig have criticized the Linda problem based on
its wording, however, similar results have been found in many follow-up studies including collaborations between
Kahnemen and Hertwig (Mellers, B., Hertwig, R., & Kahneman, D., 2001).
ii
I fully concede that from a default-interventionist perspective, errors could also occur because the analytical
system affirms an inaccurate judgment by the heuristic systems error or even because the analytical system overrides
a correct judgment by the heuristic system. I only suggest errors are most likely when the analytical system does not
intervene to correct a heuristic-based error
iii
An alternative way to test Hypothesis 1 would be to use the log of the amount of information considered as the
dependent variable in a standard regression (Delmar & Shane 2006). Thus, I also followed this procedure, which
further supported my predictions in Hypothesis 1. Specifically, regression analyses revealed a negative relationship
between the reliance on a cognitive heuristic (the betrayal condition) and the log of the amount of information
2
considered ( = -.458, p < .05, ∆R =.10*). Results are presented in Table 5
iv
A major limitation of collection 1 of Study 1 is the sample size (n = 55). It should be noted, however, that these
findings were replicated, using a 90% bootstrapped confidence interval, using the earlier version of the manipulation
provided in Appendix M with a sample of 270 student and non-student participants.
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